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Behaviour-Based Price Discrimination with Retention
Strategies
Abstract
In imperfect competitive markets rms have some market power, thus the prac-
tice of price discrimination is possible. In oligopolistic models, behaviour-based price
discrimination is analyzed following two di¤erent approaches: the switching costs ap-
proach and the brand preferences approach. A recent Ofcoms report makes a reminder
to the practice of rms implementing retention strategies, as a way to discourage cus-
tomers to change the current supplier o¤ering to all customers who show an intention
to switch a special price discount.
The main objective of this Master Dissertation is to develop a theoretical model
that analyzes the e¤ects of retention strategies under the switching costs approach.
After consumers have made their rst-period consumption decisions and decide to
change supplier in the second-period, they have to incur switching costs. It is a
model that extends Chen (1997) by allowing rms to employ retention strategies. It
is also a model based on Esteves and Rey (2010), that consider retention activity but
under the brand preferences approach.
The results, when compared to those obtained without retention strategies, sug-
gest (i) a lower deadweight loss due the less ine¢ cient switching; (ii) a lower rms
prots; and (iii) a higher consumerssurplus.
Keywords: Behaviour-based price discrimination, retention strategies, switching
costs
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Discriminação de Preços com Estratégias de Retenção
Resumo
Em mercados de concorrência imperfeita, devido ao poder de mercado das empre-
sas, a prática de discriminação de preços torna-se possível. Nos modelos de oligopólio,
a discriminação de preços, com base no reconhecimento do perl de compra do con-
sumidor, é analisada segundo duas abordagens: a dos custos de mudança associados
à troca de empresa ou a das preferências (exógenas) do consumidor. No relatório de
2010 da Ofcom, é feita uma chamada de atenção para a prática da implementação de
estratégias de retenção, como forma de desencorajar os consumidores a trocarem de
empresa, através da oferta de um desconto a todos aqueles que mostram intenção de
trocar. O objetivo desta Dissertação de Mestrado consiste no desenvolvimento de um
modelo teórico que analise os efeitos da implementação de estratégias de retenção, sob
a abordagem que os consumidores têm custos associados à mudança de empresa, após
terem feito a sua escolha inicial. É um modelo que resulta de uma extensão daquele
que é apresentado no artigo de Chen (1997), considerando os mesmo pressupostos
base e incluindo a capacidade das empresas em denirem estratégias de retenção. É
igualmente um modelo assente no apresentado em Esteves e Rey (2010), que incor-
pora a capacidade das empresas em praticarem estratégias de retenção, mas seguindo
a abordagem das preferências exógenas dos consumidores. Os resultados, quando
comparados com os obtidos no caso da impossibilidade de implementação de estraté-
gias de retenção, sugerem (i) uma menor perda de bem-estar, resultado da menor
troca dos consumidores; (ii) um menor lucro para as empresas e (iii) um aumento no
bem-estar dos consumidores.
Palavras-chave: Discriminação de preços, perl de compra do consumidor, estreté-
gias de retenção, custos de mudança
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Price discrimination is a ubiquitous phenomenon. [. . . ] Thus, the analysis of the forms that
price discrimination can take and the e¤ects of price discrimination on economic welfare are a
very important aspect of the study of industrial organization.
Hal Varian (1989), Handbook of Industria l O rgan ization , Vol. 1
In many imperfectly competitive markets rms can have the tools to engage in price
discrimination practices. According to Stiglers (1987) denition, price discrimination is
the ability of rms to charge di¤erent prices in the selling of the same or similar products
where the ratios of their marginal costs are di¤erent.
Usually, we can see di¤erent forms of price discrimination in several day-to-day cases,
such as studentsdiscounts on cinema tickets or di¤erential pricing on business and leisure
airline travellers. According to Pigou (1920) there are three types of price discrimina-
tion. Under rst-degree price discrimination, rms are able to charge a di¤erent price
to di¤erent consumers according to their willingness to pay. In this case, price is equal
to the consumers reservation price and rms are able to extract the entire consumer
surplus. Second-degree price discrimination occurs when rms charge nonlinear prices to
consumers. The most common examples are the discounts to consumers who buy large
amounts of the product (quantity discounts) or the imposition of a two-part tari¤, i.e.,
rms require that consumers pay a xed fee (regardless of the quantity bought) plus a
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variable component (that depends on the quantity bought). Third-degree price discri-
mination is probably the most common form of price discrimination and it arises when
rms charge di¤erent prices according to the consumers observable characteristics.
Third-degree price discrimination is the most common form of this business practice.
Charging di¤erent prices to di¤erent consumer groups is the most commonly used. A
new type of third-degree price discrimination has been implemented recently as a result
of the developments in information technologies. Firms have been increasingly able to
gather and record more information about consumerspreferences and use this informa-
tion to charge di¤erent prices according to the consumerspurchase history. This type
of price discrimination has been known in the economic literature as Behaviour-Based
Price Discrimination (BBPD)1. Since rms are able to recognise their own customers
and those of their rivals, rms can try to poach the customers of their rivals by o¤ering
them better deals. This may lead some customers to switch providers.
The analysis of BBPD has been done on the basis of two approaches. In the brand
preferences approach purchase history discloses information about consumers exogenous
brand preferences (e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole (2000)). In the switching costs approach
purchase history discloses information about consumersswitching costs (Chen (1997)).
In a recent Ofcoms report 2 a new form of price discrimination is identied: save or
retention strategies. This strategy is as a way to make it less attractive for a customer
to search for and switch to a competing rm, i.e., save activity discourages customers
to switch because the switching process is more expensive. In a Losing Provider Led
(LPL) 3 process, for the consumersswitching process to be completed, customers have
1Behaviour-based price discrimination is also known as price discrimination based on purchase history
or dynamic pricing.
2Ofcom is an independent regulator and competition authority for the United King-
dom communications industries. See the report in Strategic review of consumer switch-
ing, Ofcom, September 2010 (http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/consumer-
switching/summary/switching.pdf).
3An alternative to the LPL process is the Gaining Provider Led (GPL) process. Under the GPL
process, customers only need to agree to a deal with their new provider who then contacts the customers
existing provider to complete the switching. In contrast with the LPL process, under the GPL process the
switching process is easier but the risks of mis-selling are higher because customers have less information
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to validate a code that has to be requested from the existing rm. In the United Kingdom,
customers who want to switch their mobile telephone service must contact their existing
provider and request a porting authorization code 4 which they then put through to their
new provider in order to complete the switching process. So, this code request provides
rms with the information that the consumers are willing to switch and allows rms to
o¤er advantageous deals to those customers with the objective of retaining them. Since
save activity can potentially make more di¢ cult the switching processes, it is important
to understand the economic and welfare e¤ects of this business practice.
Motivated by the Ofcom report Esteves and Rey (2010) are the rst to investigate
the competitive and welfare e¤ects of BBPD when rms can also engage in retention
strategies. They do that in the context of the brand preference approach. They show
moving from BBPD with no retention strategies to BBPD with retention strategies is
bad for industry prots but good for consumers and overall welfare.
This Dissertation has two main goals. First, it aims to o¤er a review of the main re-
sults derived in the literature on BBPD taking into account the two approaches. Second,
it aims to develop a theoretical model to investigate the economic and welfare e¤ects
of BBPD with retention strategies in the switching costs approach. Thus, the model
developed in this thesis is based on Chen (1997) and Esteves and Rey (2010).
This Dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents in detail the models
who give rise to each approach as well as their main ndings. We will also discuss the
comparison between the results in both approches. First, it is presented the Chens (1997)
model of BBPD in the switching costs approach. Then, it is presented the same steps
for the case of Fudenberg and Tiroles (2000) model of BBPD in the brand preferences
approach. In the end of this Chapter it is presented some of the main extentions to the
economic literature on BBPD.
Chapter 3 introduces retention strategies in the the two-approaches presented in
about the implications of the switching process.
4The request of a porting authorisation code (PAC) occurs only when customers wish to change their
mobile provider but want to maintain their existing phone number.
5
Chapter 2. Using the model of Esteves and Reys (2010), Section 3.1 analyses the e¤ects
of BBPD with retention strategies under the brand preferences approach. The main
contribution of this thesis can be found in Section 3.2 where it is developed a theoretical
model with BBPD and retention strategies in the switching costs approach. The welfare
analysis is presented in section 3.2.3. Finally, Chapter 4 presents the main conclusions
of this work.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
In markets with repeated purchases, rms are able to recognise consumerspast purchase
information and this feature allows rms to charge di¤erent prices to di¤erent consumers.
We can nd some examples in telecommunication markets or in banking sectors. In
telecommunication markets it is usual that one rm o¤ers a lower price to a customer
who uses a rivals service. Or, in the banking sector it is usual that one banking company
o¤ers a lower interest rate to a customer who change company. We can notice that
in these two examples there are two common features. First, the price that one rm
charge depends on consumers past purchases, namely whether or not the consumer
bought from a competitor rm in the past. This implies a dynamic interaction in the
marketplace. In these markets rms do not have to commit to their futures prices and can
learn about consumers and segment the market in a better way. Second, these examples
operate under imperfect competitive markets, namely in oligopolistic markets. This form
of price discrimination is designed in the economic literature by behaviour-based price
discrimination (BBPD). Thus, in broad terms, behaviour-based price discrimination is
a form of price discrimination in which each rm charges a di¤erent price to di¤erent
consumers according to their past purchases (consumerspurchase prole).
The literature for this study is mainly grounded on price discrimination in imperfectly
competitive markets, specically on the BBPD literature. Works from Chen (2005), Fu-
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denberg and Villas-Boas (2006) and Esteves (2009b) gather the most important surveys
on BBPD. On the other hand, Armstrong (2006) and Stole (2007) focus on price dis-
crimination in imperfectly competitive markets.
There are two common approaches to modelling behaviour-based price discrimination:
the switching costs approach and the brand preferences approach. The switching costs
approach is based on the model presented in Chen (1997). In this approach rms and
consumers interact for two periods. In the beginning of the game the rmsproduct
are perfect substitutes, however after rst period decisions have been made consumers
are in some way locked-in to their previous supplier due to the existence of switching
costs. Thus, purchase history reveals information about switching costs. The second
approach is due to Fudenberg and Tirole (2000). They propose a two-period model where
consumers have di¤erent brand preferences for the rmsproducts from the beginning.
Here, purchase history reveals information about exogenous brand preferences.
The aim of this chapter is to present in detail the models who give rise to each
approach as well as their main ndings. We will also discuss the comparison between
the results in both approches. First, it is presented the Chens (1997) model with price
discrimination and comparing it with the benchmark case without price discrimination.
Then, it is presented the same steps for the case of Fudenberg and Tiroles (2000) model.
Finally, we discuss some of the main extensions that have been proposed on the BBPD
literature, as is the case of assuming that rms can engage in BBPD with retention
strategies.
2.1 Switching Costs Approach
This section presents the main economic e¤ects of behaviour-based price discrimination
in the switching cost approach. We review the two period model developed in Chen
(1997) in which rms o¤er in each period an homogeneous product but consumers have
8
to incur a switching cost if they decide to change suppliers after the initial purchase 1.
Based on past purchase history rms can recognise a previous own customer and a rivals
one and price discriminate accordingly. Chen called this practice "paying customers to
switch".
It is assumed that there are two rms, A and B, and that each rm produces an
homogeneous product with constant and equal marginal cost c, c  0:There is a unit
mass of consumers and each consumer wants to buy one unit of the product either from
rm A or B. Consumersreservation price is given by v. In the rst period, each rm
chooses simultaneously its price, pi1; i = A;B: In the end of period 1; after consumers
have made their decisions of consumption, each rm gets a proportion of the market,
resulting in proportion  for rm A and (1   ) for rm B, where 0    1. After
consumersrst-period decisions have been made, in period 2 each rm can identify their
own customers and the rivals customers. If a consumer switches to purchase from a
di¤erent supplier he has to incur a switching cost, s uniformly distributed on [0; ]. In
the second period, rms can price discriminate between their own customers and the
rivals customers, choosing a set of prices (poi2; p
r
i2);with i = A;B. Firms and consumers
discount second-period prots using the same discount factor, namely  2 [0; 1] :
2.1.1 Second-period Equilibrium
As usual the model is solved by backward induction. In the second period, each rm
can recognise their own customers and the rivals customers and charge di¤erent prices
1According to Klemperer (1987) there are at least three types of switching costs: transaction costs,
learning costs and articial (or contractual) costs. Transactions costs are present when the switching
occurs between identical services. A typical example is costs incurred when a consumer changes his
bank account, which involves the closing of one set of accounts and the opening of another set in another
bank. Learning costs are incurred when consumers only switch to a new provider (that is new for him).
An example is the costs associated to get a new word processing system that has the same functions
as others but that also has a manual written in a di¤erent style. The third type of switching costs is
articial or contractual costs and arises entirely at rmsdiscretion (and there are no social costs of
brand switching). The two-rst types of switching costs reect real social costs of switching between
brands.
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at these di¤erent segments of consumers. In this way, rms charge a set of prices such
that poi2 is the price for existing customers and p
r
i2 is the price for rivals customers.
The indi¤erent consumer between choosing again rm i or switch to rm j in the
second period is such that
v   poi2 = v   prj2   s
with i; j = A;B and i 6= j.
Thus,
s = poi2   prj2
Consumers with s > poi2 prj2 buy again from their currtent suppliers while those with
s < poi2   prj2 do switch.
Let us qAA represent all consumers that buy again from rm A (with high switching
costs) and qBA represent all consumers switch from rm A to rm B in the second period
(with low switching costs). Given that s  U [0; ], it follows that
qAA = 
Z 
s
f(s)ds =


(  poA2 + prB2) (i)
And, qBA is given by
qBA = 
Z s
0
f(s)ds =


(poA2   poB2) (ii)
Doing the same for rm B it is straightforward to obtain:
qBB = (1  )
Z 
s
f(s)ds =
(1  )

(1  poB2 + prA2) (iii)
qAB = (1  )
Z s
0
f(s)ds =
(1  )

(poB2   prA2) (iv)
In this period, rm A and rm Bs prots are, respectively,
A2 = (p
o
A2   c)qAA + (prA2   c)qAB
10
B2 = (p
o
B2   c)qBB + (prB2   c)qBA
Substituting equations (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv), in the above prot functions we obtain:
A2 =


(poA2   c) (1  poA2 + prB2) +
(1  )

(prA2   c)(poB2   prA2)
B2 =
(1  )

(poB2   c) (1  poB2 + prA2) +


(prB2   c)(poA2   prB2)
Given that qii is the number of consumers that choose rm i in both periods (1 and
2), and qji the number of consumers that choose rm i in the rst period and switch to
rm j in the second period it follows that rmi second-period prots are
i = (p
o
i2   c)qii + (pri2   c)qij; i = A;B
In this period each rm chooses simultaneously and non-cooperatively the pair of
prices (poi2; p
r
i2) as a way to maximize i: From the prot maximization problem we
obtain the following result.
Proposition 1 In the switching costs approach without retention strategies, second-
period equilibrium prices are given by
poi2 =
2
3
+ c
pri2 =
1
3
+ c
with i = A;B.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Thus, each rm charges a lower price to the rivals customers than to its own customers
in the second period. Additionally, consumers with high switching costs (s > 1
3
) will
not change supplier in the second period while those with lower switching costs change
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supplier in period 2. An important remark is that in the second-period equilibrium, prices
do not depend on rmsmarket shares. This means that in the rst period, consumers
will purchase from the rm with lower price and if prices are equal, rms split evenly the
market.
Each rm has the following second-period equilibrium prots,
A2 =

3

1
3
+ 

(1)
B2 =

3

4
3
  

(2)
2.1.2 First-period Equilibrium
In the rst period each rm chooses its rst-period price taking into account how such
price a¤ects rst-period prot as well as second-period prots. As rmsproducts are
perfect substitutes in period 1 all consumers purchase from the rm which o¤ers the
lowest price. When rst-period prices are equal it is assumed that a consumer buys from
either rm with equal probability. The number of consumers who buy from rm A in
period 1 is given by  and all the remaining consumers buy from rm B. This means
that
qA1 = 
and,
qB1 = 1  
In broad terms, rm A overall prot can be written as
A = A1 + 

A2
A = (pA1   c)+ 
3

1
3
+ 

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Doing the same for rm B, it follows that its overall prot is
B = (pB1   c)(1  ) + 
3

4
3
  

Now, we have to analyse the di¤erent situations that can occur in the rst period.
From the Bertrand game, three situations are possible: (i) pA1 = pB1; (ii) pA1 < pB1;
and (iii) pA1 > pB1.
Consider rst the case where pA1 = pB1 and  = 12 : In this case both rms have the
same overall prot, given by
i =
1
2
(pi1   c) + 5
18

with i = A;B.
Consider now the case where pA1 < pB1 and  = 1. In this case, rm As overall
prot is
A = pA1   c+ 4
9

and rm Bs overall prot is given by
B =

9
.
Finally, if pA1 > pB1 it follows that  = 0: In this case, rm As overall prot is
A =

9
and rm Bs overall prot is given by
B = pB1   c+ 4
9
.
Solving the equilibrium for the entire game we can show that the game has a unique
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subgame perfect equilibrium dened in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In the model with price discrimination in the switching costs approach,
there is a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium, in which rm is rst-period equilibrium
price is given by
pi1 = c 

3
second period equilibrium prices are given by
poi2 =
2
3
+ c
pri2 =
1
3
+ c
and overall equilibrium prot is equal to
i =
1
9
:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that rst-period equilibrium price is lower than marginal cost. The reason is
that rms try to capture more customers in the rst-period as a way to increase their
base of locked-in customers.
In order to evaluate the economic e¤ects of price discrimination in the switching costs
approach we present next the benchmark case where price discrimination is for any reason
not permitted.
2.1.3 No discrimination benchmark case in the switching costs
approach
This analysis is also based in Chen (1997). Consider the same model as before except that
now price discrimination cannot for any reason occur in period 2 (e.g. it is prohibited
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or rms cannot segment consumers). Thus, each rm charges a uniform price in period
2, namely pui2, i = A;B: After observing the price o¤ered by each rm, each consumer
makes the decision of switching or not from his previous supplier. Look rst into the
second period.
Second-period equilibrium
The indi¤erent consumer between buying again from rm A at price puA2 or switching to
rm B and pay puB2 is such that:
v   puA2 = v   puB2   s
Thus, es = puA2   puB2:
The number of consumers who buy from rmA (quA) are only those with high switching
costs (es > puA2   puB2). Firm B captures the remaining consumers. Therefore,
quA = 
Z 
es
1

ds =


(  puA2 + puB2)
and
quB = 
Z es
0
1

ds+ (1  )
Z 
0
1

ds =


(puA2   puB2) + (1  ):
Each rm has the following prot function,
uA2 = (p
u
A2   c)quA


(puA2   c)(  puA2 + puB2)
uB2 = (p
u
B2   c)quB =


(puB2   c)(puA2   puB2) + (1  )(puB2   c)
15
Proposition 3 In the switching cost approach with no price discrimination, second-
period prices depend on rst-period market share and are given by:
puA2 =
8<:
(1+)
3
+ c, if   1
2
(1+)
3(1 )+ c, if  <
1
2
puB2 =
8<:
(2 )
3
+ c, if   1
2
(2 )
3(1 )+ c, if  <
1
2
Each rm has the following equilibrium prots
uA2 =
8<:
(1+)2
9
, if   1
2
(1+)2
9(1 ), if  <
1
2
(3)
uB2 =
8<:
(2 )2
9
, if   1
2
(2 )2
9(1 ), if  <
1
2
(4)
Proof. See the Appendix.
In contrast to the equilibrium under price discrimination, when rms cannot price
discriminate second-period prices do depend on rst-period market share: a rms second-
period price is an increasing function of its previous market share.
Corollary 1. When  = 1
2
second-period uniform prices are equal to puA2 = p
u
B2 =
 + c: Thus, being permitted price discrimination decreases second-period prices. As a
result of that second-period prots fall down with price discrimination.
First-period equilibrium
Without price discrimination, a rm with higher market share will charge a higher price
in the second period. Consumers are rational and take this into account when they
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make their consumption decisions in period 1. Considering for instance the case where
puA2  puB2, where   12 .
Given es = puA2   puB2, in the rst period and at given pair of prices (puA1; puB1), the
indi¤erent consumer between to buy from rm A or buy from rm B is
v   puA1 + 

v  
Z 
es p
u
A2
1

ds 
Z es
0
(puB2 + s)
1

ds

= v   puB1 +  (v   puB2)
Simplifying, we can get that
puA1   puB1 + 

(puA2   puB2) 
1
2
(puA2   puB2)2

= 0:
From second-period equilibrium prices we have that (puA2 puB2) = (2 1)3 , for   12 .
Substituting in the equation above we nd that
puA1   puB1 +
(2  1)(4+ 1)
182
= 0
First-period prot for each rm is
uA1 = (p
u
A1   c)
and
uB1 = (p
u
B1   c)(1  )
Proposition 4 Without price discrimination and under the switching costs approach,
rst-period equilibrium price is given by
pui1 = c+
2
3

for i = A;B.
Proof. See the Appendix.
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It is interesting to note that the ability of rms to recognise customers and price
discriminate accordingly in period 2, reduces rst and second-period prices. Second-
period equilibrium prices are lower with price discrimination, as well the rst-period
equilibrium prices.
2.1.4 Welfare Analysis
This section aims to evaluate the welfare e¤ects of BBPD in the switching cost approach.
In this analysis we take into account the symmetric SPNE obtained with and without
discrimination.
Look rst at consumer surplus.
With BBPD without retention strategies, the overall consumer surplus is
CSnr = v   pi1 + 

v  
Z 
s
poi2
1

ds+
Z s
0
(pri2 + s)
1

ds

CSnr = v   c+ 1
3
 + 

v   2
3

2
3
+ c

  1
3

1
3
+ c+
1
6


CSnr = (1 + )(v   c)  5
18

Without price discrimination and with  = 1
2
, the overall consumer surplus is given
by
CSnd = v   pui1 + (v   pui2 )
CSnd = v   c  2
3
+  (v     c)
CSnd = (1 + )(v   c)  5
3

We have already seen that when  = 1
2
all consumers pay a higher price in both
periods under no price discrimination. Therefore, consumer surplus is higher under the
case when rms "pay consumers to switch".
By the same reason, both rmsequilibrium prots are lower with price discrimination
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than without price discrimination. And, with BBPD without retention strategies and
with  = 1
2
, the overall prots of each rm, nr, is
nr = i1 + 

i2
nr =
1
2

c  
3
  c

+ 

1
9
+
1
6

nr =

9
Without price discrimination and considering  = 1
2
, the overall prots of each rm,
nd, is
nd = i1 + 

i2
nd =
1
2

c+
2
3
  c

+ 

1
2


nd =
5
6

With price discrimination we can note that rmsprots are lower than without price
discrimination. Thus, price discrimination is bad for rms.
The overall welfare is given by the sum of consumer surplus and industry prots.
With BBPD with no retention strategies, the overall welfare, W nr, is given by
W nr = CSnr +nrind
W nr =

(1 + )(v   c)  5
18


+
2
9
W nr = ( + 1) (v   c)  1
18

And, without price discrimination, the overall welfare, W nd, is
W nd = CSnd +ndind
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W nd =

(1 + )(v   c)  5
3


+
10
6

W nd = (1 + )(v   c)
Note that,
W nr  W nd =   1
18
 < 0
Thus, we observe that price discrimination is bad for overall welfare due to the
ine¢ cient switching. As expected with price discrimination there is a deadweight loss in
the second period, given by
DWLnr = 
Z 
3
0
sf(s)ds =

18
Without price discrimination and with  = 1
2
, puA2 = p
u
B2 = +c and es = 0. Following
this result, there is no deadweight loss without price discrimination.
The following table summarises the welfare e¤ects of price discrimination.
Consumer Surplus Firm Prots Welfare Deadweight loss
Without (v   c)(1 + )  5
3
 5
6
 (1 + )(v   c)  
With (1 + )(v   c)  5
18
 
9
( + 1) (v   c)  1
18
 
18
" CS #  # W " DWL
With price discrimination, second-period and rst-period prices are lower than the
uniform price. Thus, the consumers surplus increases (more consumers pay a lower
price) and rms prots descrease (for the same reason). Because some consumers change
supplier and there is a cost of switching and a deadweight loss due the swictching.
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2.2 Brand Preferences Approach
Now it is assumed that consumers have brand preferences for the two products as in
Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) which are present from the begining and xed accross the
two periods of the game. There are two rms, A and B, with constant marginal cost c,
c  0. Each consumer desires to buy one unit of product from either rm A or B, in each
of the two periods. Each consumer willingness to pay v is su¢ ciently high such that no
consumer stays out of the market. Consumers have exogenous preferences, , distributed
on a Hotteling line of unit length, such that  2 [0; 1]. As made by Chen (2005) we
present a simplied variation of the Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), by assuming that 
is uniformly distributed on [0; 1] : Firms are located at the endpoints of the Hotellings
line and consumers have to incur transportation costs t, per unit distance. This means
that a consumer located at x incurs total cost pA + tx if decide to buy from rm A at
price pA; if he decides to buy from rm B at price pB he has to incur total cost given by
pB + t(1   x). In the rst period, rms cannot observe consumerspreferences so they
quote a uniform price. After consumersdecisions have been made, each rm is able
to recognise their own previous customers and the rivals previous customers and price
discriminate accordingly.
2.2.1 Second-period Equilibrium
Suppose that from rst period competition rm A serves all consumers to the left of 1
and rm B serves all consumers in the right of 1. So, when rms can recognise their
own customers and rivals customers, they can charge di¤erent prices to those di¤erent
customerssegment.
Let us rst look at rm As turf, where  2 [0; 1]. In the second period, a consumer
located at A is indi¤erent between buying again from rm A or switching to rm B i¤
poA2 + tA = p
r
B2 + t(1  A)
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A =
1
2
+
prB2   poA2
2t
Consumers with  2 [0; A] have a strong preference for rm A and they decide to
buy again from rm A. On the other hand, consumers with  2 [A; 1] decide to change
from rm A to rm B in the second period.
Similarly, on rm Bs turf we have that
B =
1
2
+
poB2   prA2
2t
Graphically,
Customer poaching and brand switching (in Fudenberg and
Tirole (2000))
Look again on rm As turf. In this turf each rm (A and B) solves the following
maximization problem:
Max
poA2

(poA2   c)

1
2
+
prB2   poA2
2t

Max
prB2

(prB2   c)

1   1
2
  p
r
B2   poA2
2t

Solving the maximization problem we can nd the following results
Proposition 5 Under the brand preferences approach, second-period equilibrium prices
are given by
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(i) if 1
4
 1  34 :
poA2 =
1
3
t(21 + 1) + c; p
r
A2 =
1
3
t(3  41) + c
poB2 =
1
3
t(3  21) + c; prB2 =
1
3
t(41   1) + c
(ii) if 1  14 :
poA2 = t(1  21) + c; prA2 =
1
3
t(3  41) + c
poB2 =
1
3
t(3  21) + c; prB2 = c
(iii) if 1  34 :
poA2 =
1
3
t(21 + 1) + c; p
r
A2 = c
poB2 = t(21   1) + c; prB2 =
1
3
t(41   1) + c
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the interior solution, when 1
4
 1  34 , both rms have the same prot in the
second period, given by
i2 =
5
9
t(221   21 + 1) (10)
with i = A;B.
Corollary 2. With 1 = 12 , each rm has the same prot in second period, given by
i2 =
5
18
t.
2.2.2 First-period Equilibrium
Given pi1; i = A;B, the indi¤erent consumer is located at 1 such that
pA1 + t1 +  [p
r
B2 + t(1  1)] = pB1 + t(1  1) +  [prA2 + t1]
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Simplifying and substituing prB2 and p
r
A2, rst-period demand is
1 =
1
2
+
3(pB1   pA1)
2t(3 + )
In the rst period, the equilibrium choices are about pA1 and pB1. 1 is a function
of rst-period prices, such that 1 = f(pA1; pB1) and in the interior solution, when
1
4
 1  34 , the overall objective function for rm is prots is
(pi1   c)1(pi1) + 

5
9
t
 
2(1(pi1))
2   21(pi1) + 1

with i = A;B.
Proposition 6 In the model with price discrimination under brand preferences approach
there is a unique equilibrium given by
pi1 =
t
3
(3 + ) + c
and second-period equilibrium prices, with i = A;B
poi2 =
2
3
t+ c and pri2 =
1
3
t+ c
and overall prots
i =
t
18
(8 + 9)
Proof. See the Appendix.
2.2.3 No discrimination benchmark case in the brand
preferences approach
If rms cannot recognise their own customers and rivals customers, they cannot price
discriminate. Thus, in both periods rms behave like in the standart Hotelling model.
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The indi¤erent consumer is located at  such that:
puA + t = p
u
B2 + t(1  )
 =
1
2
+
puB   puA
2t
In each period rm A and B solve the following problem:
Max
puA
uA = (p  c)
Max
puB
uB = (p
u
B   c)(1  )
It is straightforward to show the following result.
Proposition 7 Without price discrimination, each rm price in period 1 and 2 is:
pu = t+ c:
Overall prot is
u =
1
2
t (1 + ) :
Proof. See the Appendix.
2.2.4 Welfare Analysis
This section discusses the welfare e¤ects of BBPD in the brand preferences approach. To
achieve this goal we compute rst overall welfare (W nd), consumer surplus (CSnd) and
industry prots (nd) with no discrimination.
Without price discrimination
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As usual each period welfare can be conputed as W = v   ETC, where ETC is the
expected transport cost. In each period welfare w is
w = v  
 Z 1
2
0
txdx+
Z 1
1
2
t(1  x)dx
!
w = v   1
4
t
Overall welfare with no discrimination is thus given by W nd = w1 + w2, so
W nd =

v   1
4
t

(1 + )
The prots of industry correspond to the sum of the two rms prots and is given by
nd = t(1 + )
Consumer surplus is given by CSnd = W nd   nd; thus
CSnd =

v   5
4
t

(1 + )
With price discrimination
We now compute overall welfare (W nr), consumer surplus (CSnr) and industry prots
(nr) with discrimination. When rms can price discriminate between old and new
customers, second-period welfare is:
wnr2 = v  
Z A
0
txdx+
Z 1
A
t(1  x)dx+
Z B
1
txdx+
Z 1
B
t(1  x)dx

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In the equilibrium, 1 = 12 , A =
1
3
and B = 23 . So, second-period welfare is given by
wnr2 = v  
"Z 1
3
0
txdx+
Z 1
2
1
3
t(1  x)dx+
Z 2
3
1
2
txdx+
Z 1
2
3
t(1  x)dx
#
wnr2 = v  
11
36
t
In the rst period, the welfare is
wnr1 = v  
 Z 1
2
0
txdx+
Z 1
1
2
t(1  x)dx
!
wnr1 = v  
1
4
t
Joining both expressions, overall welfare is given by
W nr = w1 + w2
W nr =

v   1
4
t

+ 

v   11
36
t

W nr = v(1 + )  1
4
t  11
36
t
Overall industry is given by
nr =
2
18
t(9 + 8)
Given the overall welfare and industry prots, the overall consumer surplus is given
by
CSnr = W nr   nr
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CSnr =

v(1 + )  1
4
t  11
36
t

 

2
18
t(9 + 8)

CSnr = v(1 + )  5
4
t  43
36
t
The table below presents the welfare ndings when we move from no discrimination
to discrimination in the brand preference approach. It shows that industry prots and
overall welfare decrease but consumer surplus increases.
Welfare Consumer Surplus Industry Prots
Without
 
v   1
4
t

(1 + )
 
v   5
4
t

(1 + ) t(1 + )
With v(1 + )  1
4
t  11
36
t v(1 + )  5
4
t  43
36
t 2
18
t(9 + 8)
# W " ECS # 
Comparison between the two approaches
After the analysis of behaviour-based price discrimation under the switching costs and
the brand preferences approach, we can make some remarks about the main results.
The results of two approaches have some common features. In both approaches price
discrimination decreases second-period equilibrium prices. If rms can recognise their
own customers and rivals customers through consumers past purchase history, they
can charge a lower second-period price to rivals customers in order to attract them.
Moreover, price discrimination reduces equilibrium prots and the overall welfare due to
ine¢ cient consumer switching.
There are some diferences between the two approaches. In particular, under switching
costs approach prices increases over time and under brand preferences approach prices
decreases over time. In markets with repeated purchases consumers are "locked-in"
because with switching costs it is more di¢ cult to change supplier in second period.
Thus, rms compete harder in order to acquire consumers in the rst period and charge
a lower initial price. And, since customers are locked-in, in the second period rms
increase their prices. On the other hand, in the model present in Fudenberg and Tirole
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(2000) it is assumed that consumers are forward looking and they preview a lower price
in the second period (consumers become less elastic in period 1). Given this assumption,
rms are able to rise their rst-period price and prices decrease over time.
2.3 Some of the main extensions on BBPD
Considering the models presented in Chen (1997) and Fudenberg and Tirole (2000),
some extentions have been made under each approach. The models were extended to
multiple periods and multiple rms, to other distributions of consumerspreferences and
to markets where advertising is needed to inform consumers.
Under the switching costs approach, Taylor (2003) generalizes the model presented in
Chen (1997) considering n rms in the market, which means that the market becomes
more competitive. In his study, Taylor (2003) investigates competition and consumer
behaviour in subscription markets, where each rms knows its customers. In this market,
a rm can attract new customers o¤ering a low introductory price while simultaneously
exploiting its own customers. In the case when there are only two rms operating in the
market, competition is soft and each rm has positive prots. When there are three or
more rms, each rm earns rent of its customer base but zero economic prots. That
happens because each rm o¤ers the switcher an introductory price below cost in order to
attract more rivals customers, and later recoups this through nonswitchers. Compared
with the duopolistic market, competitive markets can be less e¢ cient because the lower
introductory prices induce more consumers to switch.
Under the brand preferences approach, Villas-Boas (1999) considers a situation in a
duopoly with innitely lived rms and overlapping generations of consumers. Consumers
have relative preferences for rmsproducts and, considering a two-period model, in each
period new consumers arrive and old consumers leave the market. The main results are
that (i) in equilibrium prices are lower because rms compete hard in order to attract
rivals customers; (ii) greater consumer patience also lowers equilibrium prices because
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consumers become indi¤erent to which product to buy rst, hence more sensitive to the
current prices (it intensies competition); and, (iii) greater rm patience softens the com-
petitive interaction. Chen and Zhang (2009) consider the practice of dynamic targeted
pricing based on consumer purchase history. Here, it is considered that rms and con-
sumers behave strategically and that there are three segments of consumers in the market.
The rst two segments include those consumers who are loyal to rm A and rm B (and
where consumers purchase always from this rms). The third segment of consumers
consists of switchers, who always change provider in the second period. Firms only can
recognise the segment of consumers after the rst-period purchase decisions. With the
presence of strategic consumers, there is a reduction of price competition, which implies
that consumers are worse o¤, and rms prots and social welfare increase. Considering
the case where the distribution of consumerspreferences is discrete (binary distribution),
Esteves (2010) analyses the competitive e¤ects of price discrimination based on customer
recognition in a duopolistic market. The welfare results and customer recognition do
depend on what is learned about consumerscharacteristics, which in turn depends on
the distribution of preferences. The main conclusion of this work is that price discrim-
ination based on customer recognition is bad for prots but good for consumers and
social welfare. Esteves (2009a) incorporates the advertising as an important informative
task, both for consumers and rms. It is considered the case where a rm recognises the
consumerspurchase history and targets them with di¤erent advertising. Only the rm
that advertises the highest price in the rst period has information to engage in price
discrimination. It is identied as "the race for discrimination e¤ect", where each rm
has an incentive to price high in the initial period. Because price discrimination softens
competition rather than intensify it, all rms are better o¤ even if only one rm can
engage price discrimination. Consequently, consumers are worse o¤ and social welfare
decreases.
A recent extention was done by Esteves and Rey (2010), considering the case when
rms can implement retention strategies. Under the LPL process, the request of a code
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provides the rms information about the consumers that are willing to switch and allows
them to suggest counter-o¤ers with the intention of retaining them. According to the
assumptions on Fudenberg and Tirole model, Esteves and Rey consider a two-period
model where the second-period is separated in two stages: (i) in the rst stage, each
rm chooses a set of prices for their existing and new customers and all those who want
to change providers must request an authorization code from their current provider in
order to complete the switching process; and (ii) in the second stage, given that rms
can recognise customers with a willingness to switch, they can employ save/retention
activities in an attempt to make it less attractive for a customer to switch to a competing
rm (rms o¤er a "secret" xed discount to these customers). First-period equilibrium
prices are lower in a situation where retention activities are possible than in a situation
where rms practice a uniform price (save activity is forbidden). Furthermore, with
retention strategies, consumer surplus and social welfare are increase and rmsprots
decrease.
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Chapter 3
Behaviour-Based Price
Discrimination with Retention
Strategies
In a recent report of the Ofcom it is made a reminder to the case when rms can engage in
price discrimination and save activity is feasible. If behaviour-based price discrimination
is possible and if rms are able to recognise their existing and rival customers through
past customersdecisions of consumption, rms can make the switching more di¢ cult for
all consumers that show an intention to switch supplier. Moreover, rms can recognise
their potential switcher customers because all customers who want to change supplier
must contact their existing provider and request a code (PAC) in order to complete the
switching process. In this way, all potential switchers give a signal of their willingness to
switch and rms can implement retention strategies in order to discourage the switching.
One possible way to retain customers is to o¤er them a secret discount.
Save activity is a form of price discrimination based not on the consumerscharacter-
istics (such as the willingness to pay or the age) but on the consumersbehaviour. Thus,
as explained in Esteves and Rey (2010) it is also a form of BBPD.
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With the exception of Esteves and Rey (2010) 1 there is no other work looking on
the competitive and welfare e¤ects of BBPD when rms can also engage in retention
strategies. Specically, these authors investigate the issue of BBPD with retention strate-
gies using the brand preference approach. They consider a two-period model where the
second-period is separated in two stages: (i) in the rst stage, each rm chooses a set
of prices for their existing and new customers and those who want to change providers
must request an authorization code from their current provider in order to complete the
switching process; and (ii) in the second stage, given that rms can recognise customers
with a willingness to switch, they can employ save/retention activities in an attempt
to make less attractive for a customer to switch to a competing rm (rms o¤er a "se-
cret" xed discount to this customers). They show that rst-period equilibrium prices
are lower in a situation where retention activities are possible than in a situation where
rms practice a uniform price (save activity is forbidden). Furthermore, with retention
strategies, consumer surplus and social welfare are increased and rmsprots decrease.
The main proposal of this Master Dissertation is to do the same exercise made by
Esteves and Rey (2010) but in the context of the switching costs approach, considering
as a benchmark the model of Chen (1997). In order to investigate the e¤ects of the
implementation of BBPD with retention strategies it is developed a two-period model
where in the second period rms o¤er a secret counter-o¤er (discount) for all customers
who show an intention to change supplier. And, if consumers decide to change supplier
they have to incur switching costs.
This Chapter is organised as follows. First, in Section 3.1., it is presented the model
of Esteves and Rey (2010) with the main equilibrium results and the welfare e¤ects of
retention strategies under the brand preferences approach. Then, it is presented the
1Some authors have showing an interest about this subject. McGahan and Ghemawat (1994) develop
a two period game-theoretic model, where duopolists attempt to retain old customers and attract new
ones. Authors make an empirical analysis of their model on a sample of ordinary American insurance
companies. Chen and Hitt (2002) develop and implement an approach to measure the magnitudes of
switching costs and brand loyalty for online services providers based on the random utility modelling
framework. In addition, Verhoef (2003) investigates the di¤erential e¤ects of customer relationship
perceptions marketing instruments on customer retention and customer share development over time.
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main contribution of this Master Dissertation - Section 3.2.. Following the assumptions
present in Chen (1997) the model is extended considering the ability of rms to implement
retention strategies. Initially, it is presented the model assumptions. Subsection 3.2.2.
analyses the equilibrium of the game, presenting the results of second- and rst-period
equilibrium. Then, subsection 3.2.3. analyses the welfare e¤ects of BBPD with retention
strategies. In Section 3.3. it is presented a comparison between the two approaches with
retention strategies.
3.1 Brand Preferences Approach with Retention
Strategies
This section aims to present and discuss a model of BBPD with retention strategies
in the context of brand preference approach. Motivated by the Ofcom report Esteves
and Rey (2010) investigate the competitive and welfare e¤ects of BBPD when rms can
also engage in retention strategies. They do that in the context of the brand preference
approach. As in Fudenberg and Tiorole (2000) there are two rms A and B selling a
product/service to consumers whose brand preferences are represented by a parameter
 uniformly distributed on [0; 1]. Firm A is located at 0 and rm B at 1. Consumers
want to buy one unit of product in each period either from A or B. In period 1 rms
have no way to recognise customers, thus they charge a uniform price, namely pi1. In the
second period purchase history discloses information about consumerspreferences. In
this period, there are two-stages. In the rst-stage, rms choose two prices, one targeted
to their old customers and one to the rivals customers, namely (poi ; p
r
i ). In the second
stage those customers with a real intention to switch need to contact their current supllier
and ask a code which they must communicate to their new supplier in order to complete
the switching process. With this contact, rms are able to recognise potential switchers
and o¤er them a secret counter-o¤er. In the second stage each rm chooses a discount,
di; i = A;B, to all customers that show an intention to leave.
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3.1.1 Equilibrium Analysis
As usual, the model is solved by backward induction.
Second-period equilibrium
In the rst period, the consumer located at 1 is indi¤erent between buying from rm A
or rm B, which means that rm As turf is given by [0; 1] and rm Bs turf is [1; 1].
Customer recognition with retention strategies (in Esteves and Rey
(2010))
Look rst on rm As turf. In the group of As consumers there is some of those who
are willing to switch given the prices poA2 and p
r
A2. If all consumers who are willing to
switch must contact their existing provider and request an authorization code to complete
the switching process, rms are able to recognise the potential switchers and target them
with special discounts in order to discourage the switching. So, in the group of potential
switchers there is a proportion of them who will be saved.
So, in the second period in each rms turf there are two di¤erent consumers: (i)
active consumers which are those who are expressing an intention to switch; and (ii)
inactive consumers, those who dont show any intention to switch. Only consumers who
express an intention to leave the current supplier receive the discount.
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In the second-stage of period 2, the indi¤erent consumer between buying again from
rm A at price poA2   dA or switching to rm B at price prB2 is located at A:
poA2   dA + tA = prB2 + t(1  A)
where,
A =
1
2
+
prB2   poA2 + dA
2t
The indi¤erent consumer between acting as a passive or active is located at cA, where
dA = 0, and
cA =
1
2
+
prB2   poA2
2t
In rm Bs turf, the results are similar to those obtained from rm A, such that
B =
1
2
+
poB2   prA2   dB
2t
cB =
1
2
+
poB2   prA2
2t
In the second stage each rm solves the following problem
Max
dA
(poA2   dA   c)(A   cA)
Max
dB
(poB2   dB   c)(cB   B)
Solving the problem, the secret discount o¤ered by rm A is dA = 12(p
o
A2   c) and by
rm B is dB = 12(p
o
B2   c).
In the rst stage of period 2, each rm solves the following problem on rm As turf:
Max
poA2
oA2 = (p
o
A2   c)cA + (poA2   dA   c)(A   cA); where dA =
1
2
(poA2   c)
Max
prB2
rB2 = (p
r
B2   c)(1   A); where dA =
1
2
(poB2   c)
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And, in rm Bs turf each rm wants to
Max
prA2
rA2 = (p
r
A2   c)(B   1); where dB =
1
2
(poB2   c)
Max
poB2
oB2 = (p
o
B2   dB   c)(cB   B) + (poB2   c)(1  cB); where dB =
1
2
(poB2   c)
with,
B =
1
2
+
poB2   prA2   dB
2t
cB =
1
2
+
poB2   prA2
2t
Proposition 8 When rms can price discriminate between old/new customers and have
the ability to implement retention strategies, second-period equilibrium is given by
poA2 =
2
5
t(21 + 1) + c; p
r
A2 =
2
5
t(2  31) + c
poB2 =
2
5
t(3  21) + c; prB2 =
2
5
t(31   1) + c
with,
dA =
1
5
t(21 + 1)
dB =
1
5
t(3  21)
Proof. See the Appendix.
From this result, it is straightforward that equilibrium prots for each rm is given
by:
A2 =
1
50
t(4821   361 + 19)
B2 =
1
50
t(4821   601 + 31)
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First-period equilibrium
Consumers and rms have the same discount factor , such that  2 [0; 1] ; and both are
forward-looking. In the rst-period, the indi¤erent consumer is located at 1, such that
pA1 + t1 +  [p
r
B2 + t(1  1)] = pB1 + t(1  1) +  (prA2 + t1)
1 =
1
2
+
pB1   pA1 + (prA2   poB2)
2t(1  )
Given the equilibrium prices of second-period (prA2, p
o
B2), 1 is given by
1 =
1
2
+
5(pB1   pA1)
2t(5 + )
In the rst period, the equilibrium choices are about pA1 and pB1. 1 is a function of
rst-period prices, such that 1 = f(pA1; pB1), the overall objective function for rm As
prots is
(pA1   c)1(pA1; pB1) + 

1
50
t
 
48(1(pA1; pB1))
2   36(1(pA1; pB1)) + 19

and rm Bs objective function is
(pB1   c)1(pA1; pB1) + 

1
50
t
 
48(1(pA1; pB1))
2   60(1(pA1; pB1)) + 31

Proposition 9 When rms engage in BBPD with retention strategies, there is a sym-
metric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where:
(i) rst-period equilibrium price is pi1 = t(1  25) + c;
(ii) second-period equilibrium prices are poi2 =
4
5
t+ c and pri2 =
1
5
t+ c, with di =
2
5
t;
(iii) overall prot is i =
1
50
t(12 + 25).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Comparing the results with and without retention strategies, we can note that the
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second-period price for rivals customers are lower in the case when retention strategies are
feasible; and, second-period prices for old customers are higher with retention strategies
(however, note that a portion of old customers pay a lower price because they are saved
and receive a discount). First-period equilibrium prices with retention strategies are
lower than the case without retention strategies.
3.1.2 Welfare Analysis
In models where price discrimination is not feasible and in models with price discrim-
ination (as in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) model), rst period equilibrium outcome is
e¢ cient because consumers choose the closer rm.
When rms can implement retention strategies, second-period welfare is
wr2 = v  
Z A
0
txdx 
Z 1
A
t(1  x)dx 
Z B
1
txdx 
Z 1
B
t(1  x)dx
And, in the equilibrium 1 = 12 , so A =
2
5
and B = 35 . Thus, second-period welfare
is
wr2 = v  
Z 2
5
0
txdx 
Z 1
2
2
5
t(1  x)dx 
Z 3
5
1
2
txdx 
Z 1
3
5
t(1  x)dx
wr2 = v  
4
50
t 

1
10
  9
200

t  11
200
t 

2
5
  8
25

t
wr2 = v  
27
100
t
In the rst period, rms can not price discriminate and welfare is given by
wr1 = v  
Z 1
2
0
txdx 
Z 1
1
2
t(1  x)dx
wr1 = v  
1
4
t
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The overall welfare is given by the welfare of two periods together and,
W r = wr1 + w
r
2
W r = v(1 + )  1
4
t  27
100
t
In the second period, and in the equilibrium (1 = 12), prot of each rm is 

i2 =
13
50
t.
So, second-period industry prots are
ind2 =
13
25
t
As the same way, in the rst period, each rms prot is given by i1 =
t
2
 
1  
25

and the two rms together is
ind1 = t

1  
25

Overall industry prots are given by
ind = ind1 + 
ind
2
ind =
1
25
t(12 + 25)
Consumerssurplus is equal to the diference between the overall welfare and overall
industry prots. In this way, the overall consumer surplus is given by
CSr = W r   ind
CSr =

v(1 + )  1
4
t  27
100
t

 

1
25
t(12 + 25)

CSr = v(1 + )  5
4
t  3
4
t
The conclusion of Esteves and Reys (2010) model is that with price discrimination
based on customer recognition and with retention strategies, consumers are better o¤
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while rms are worse o¤. Overall welfare increases. It is straightforward to note that
consumers surplus increase because more consumers pay a lower price (saved consumers
receive a discount and for rival customers the price is lower). By the same reason, rms
prots decrease and social welfare increase due to the consumer surplus. The brief of
results are presented in the following table.
Welfare Consumer Surplus Industry Prots
Without RS v(1 + )  1
4
t  11
36
t v(1 + )  5
4
t  43
36
t 2
18
t(9 + 8)
With RS v(1 + )  1
4
t  27
100
t v(1 + )  5
4
t  3
4
t 1
25
t(12 + 25)
" W " ECS # 
Corollary 3. For any  > 0, comparing with BBPD without retention strategies under
the brand preferences approach, BBPD with retention strategies boosts consumer surplus
and overall welfare and decreases industry prots.
3.2 Switching costs approach with retention strate-
gies
As aforementioned this section presents the main contribution of this thesis: to investigate
the economic and welfare e¤ects of BBPD with retention strategies in markets with
switching costs. Next we present the model assumptions.
3.2.1 Model
Following the assumptions presented in Chen (1997) we introduce the possibility of re-
tention strategies. There are two rms, A and B, and each rm produces a non-durable
homogenous good A and B, respectively, at a constant marginal cost, c; c  0. There
are two periods, 1 and 2. In the rst period, rms have no information to engage in
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price discrimination, thus each rm simultaneously chooses a uniform price, pA1 and pB1.
Consumers have an identical reservation value, v. In each period, each consumer wants
to buy one unit of the product, either from rm A or rm B. In the end of rst period
rm As turf is given by  and rm Bs turf is given by 1 . Firms and consumers have
an identical discount factor , such that  2 [0; 1]. In a market with repeated purchases,
purchase history allows rms to know their own customers and the rivals customers, thus
behaviour-based price discriminations becomes possible. Following the same assumptions
as in Esteves and Rey (2010) in this period it is considered a two-stage competition game.
In the rst stage, each rm is able to recognise their existing customers and those that
bought from a rival rm. Firms choose a set of two di¤erent prices, one for old customers,
poi2, and one for the rivals rm customers, p
r
A2, i = A;B. If a customer decides to switch
from his current provider he has to incur a switching cost s, uniformly distributed on
[0; ]. All customers that wish to switch must contact their existing provider and request
a code (under the LPL process) in order to complete the switching process. Due to
this contact, each rm can recognise their potential switchers (all customers who give a
signal of their intention to leave) and, at the second stage, rms can implement a reten-
tion strategy to discourage customers to switch. Each rm will o¤er a xed discount to
all consumers showing an intention to switch, di; i = A;B.
3.2.2 Equilibrium Analysis
After consumers have made their consumptions decisions in period 1, each rm can
recognise their own customers and rivals customers. So, in the second period each
rm o¤ers a set of price (poi2; p
r
i2); i = A;B. Additionaly, all those consumers who
want to change supplier in the second period have to incur switching cost, s and need
to contact their current supllier to obtain the code to complete the switching process.
These consumers can then receive a discount. The game is solved working backwards
from period 2.
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Second-period
In the second period there are two di¤erent stages: (i) in the rst stage, all consumers
who want to change supplier have to contact their existing provider and request an
authorization code in order to complete the switching process;and (ii) in the second stage,
rms can implement retention strategies in order to discourage customers to switch and
target them with a special discount price, di; i = A;B.
Second-stage
In the beginning of period 2, rm A has market share equal to  and rm B has
a market share equal to (1 ). Like in Esteves and Rey (2010) in each rms turf there
are two di¤erent consumers: (i) active consumers which are those who are expressing an
intention to switch; and (ii) inactive consumers, those who dont show any intention to
switch. Only consumers who express an intention to leave the current supplier receive
the discount.
Look rst into rm As turf. In the second-stage of period 2, the indi¤erent consumer
between buying again from rm A at price poA2   dA or switching to rm B at price prB2
is located at sA such that:
poA2   dA = prB2 + sA
where,
sA = p
o
A2   prB2   dA
The indi¤erent consumer between acting as a passive or active is located at sA, where
dA = 0, and
sA = p
o
A2   prB2
Thus consumers with switching cost sA are indi¤erent between acting as an active or
passive consumer; and those with switching cost sA are indi¤erent between accepting the
discount and buy again from A or not accepting the discount and switch to B.
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The number of consumers who bought from rm A in period 1 and switch for rm B
in period 2 is given by qBA which is equal to
qBA = 
Z sA
0
f(s)ds
On the other hand, the number of consumers who are saved and accept the discount
o¤ered by rm A, qsAA, is given by
qsAA = 
Z sA
sA
f(s)ds
And, the number of consumers bought from rm A and act as passive consumers in
the second period, qAA, is
qAA = 
Z 
sA
f(s)ds
Using sA = p
o
A2   prB2   dA and sA = poA2   prB2 it is straightfoward to nd that:
(i) switchers consumers in rm As turf are
qBA = 
Z sA
0
1

ds =


(poA2   prB2   dA)
(ii) saved consumers in rm As turf are
qsAA = 
Z sA
sA
1

ds =


dA
(iii) passive consumers in rm As turf are
qAA = 
Z 
sA
1

ds =


(  poA2 + prB2)
A similar reasoning can be applied to rm Bs turf. Thus,
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(i) switchers consumers in rm Bs turf are
qAB = (1  )
Z sB
0
1

ds =
(1  ) (poB2   prA2   dB)

(ii) saved consumers in rm Bs turf are
qsBB = (1  )
Z sB
sB
1

ds =
(1  )

dB
(iii) passive consumers in rm Bs turf are
qBB = (1  )
Z 
sA
1

ds =
(1  ) (  poB2 + prA2)

In the second stage, rm A wants to maximize the prot obtained with saved cus-
tomers. So, the maximization problem is the following
Max
dA
(poA2   dA   c)qsAA
Max
dA
(poA2   dA   c)



dA

Firm B solves a similar same maximization problem as rm A. Thus,
Max
dB
(poB2   dB   c)qsBB
Max
dB
(poB2   dB   c)

(1  )

dB

And, we get that
di =
1
2
(poi2   c)
with i = A;B.
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First-stage
Given the optimum discount price o¤ered by each rm, such that di = 12(p
o
i2   c); i =
A;B, in the rst-stage each rm wants to maximize their second-period prots. In the
second period, each rm acts in both markets (strong and weak markets). In the rm
As turf, rm A solves the following maximization problem
Max
poA2
oA2 = (p
o
A2   c)qAA + (poA2   dA   c)qsAA
s:t: dA =
1
2
(poA2   c)
while rm B solves the problem:
Max
prB2
rB2 = (p
r
B2   c)qBA
In rm Bs turf, each rm has a similar maximization problem, such that
Max
poB2
oB2 = (p
o
B2   c)qBB + (poB2   dB   c)qsBB
s:t: dB =
1
2
(poB2   c)
and,
Max
prA2
rA2 = (p
r
A2   c)qAB
Proposition 10 When rms are able to implement BBPD with retention strategies in
markets with switching costs, second-period equilibrium prices are given by:
poi2 =
4
5
+ c
pri2 =
1
5
+ c
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and the equilibrium discount is equal to:
di =
2
5

Second-period equilibrium prots is equal to:
A2 =

25
(11+ 1)
B2 =

25
(12  11)
Proof. See the Appendix.
For rivals customers second-period equilibrium prices are lower when rms have the
ability to implement retention strategies. For old customers, the price is higher with
retention strategies. However, there is a proportion of old customers who are saved and
pay a lower price because they receive a discount. As in Chen (1997) second-period prices
do not depend on market share.
Corollary 4. When rms split evenly the market in period 1,  = 1
2
and rms
prots are A2 = 

B2 =
13
50
.
First-period
As in Chens (1997) model, in the rst period no consumer is really attached to any rm
in the market. Due to the perfect substitution assumption, consumers choose the rm
which o¤ers the lowest price in period 1. In the rst period, rm A has  consumers in
the market and rm B has (1  ) consumers. It is easy to see that
 =
8>>><>>>:
1 if pA1 < pB1
1
2
if pA1 = pB1
0 if pA1 > pB1
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In period 1, each rm chooses its rst-period price simultaneously and non-cooperatively
as a way to maximise overall prots. Firm A overall prot is:
A = A1 + 

A2 =

(pA1   c)+ 
25
(11+ 1)

= 1
2
A =
8>>><>>>:
(pA1   c) + 1225 if pA1 < pB1
1
2
(pA1   c) + 1350 if pA1 = pB1

25
if pA1 > pB1
We prove the existence of an equilibrium by construction. Suppose as an hypothesis
that in the rst period both rms charge the same price, such that pA1 = pB1 and  = 12 :
In this case we have that each rm prot is equal to
i =
1
2
(pi1   c) + 13
50
, with pi1 = pj1
with i; j = A;B.
If rm A deviates and charges a lower price, i.e, pdA1 = pB1   "; then it captures all
the market and its prots from deviation is equal to (pdA1   c) + 1225 : It is therefore easy
to show that rm A has no incentive to deviate as long as pA1 = c   1125. Considering
now a deviation to a higher price it again follows that rm A has no incentive to deviate
and charge a higher rst-period price as long as pA1 = c   1125. The same reasoning is
applied to rm B. Thus, pA1 = pB1 and  = 12 is an equilibrium as long as pB1 = c  1125:
This completes the proof.
We can therefore establish the following result.
Proposition 11 In the model with BBPD with retention strategies in switching costs
approach there is an unique symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, in which:
(i) rst-period prices are given by pi1 = c  1125;
(ii) second-period equilibrium is poi2 =
4
5
+ c and pri2 =
1
5
+ c, with di = 25;
(iii) and, overall prots is i =

25
, with i = A;B.
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3.2.3 Welfare Analysis
This section analyzes the welfare e¤ects of behaviour-based price discrimination when
retention strategies are possible in the switching costs approach. In the rst period, the
equilibrium is e¢ cient because all consumers buy from the rm o¤ering the lowest price
and there are no switching costs.In the second period, because some consumers have to
incur switching costs if they decide to change supplier, there is ine¢ cient switching.
Let us look to the rmsprots. In the symmetric equilibrium rms split evenly the
market and  = 1
2
. Without retention strategies, the overall prots of each rm nr, is
nr =

9
With retention strategies, each rms overall prot, r, is given by
r =

25
Thus it is straightforward to see that
r   nr = 
25
  
9
=   16
225
 < 0:
Thus, rms are worse o¤ with retention strategies. The reason is that rms compete
more agressively with retention strategies.
Look next at overall consumer surplus. We have seen that with no retention strategies
it is equal to:
CSnr = (1 + )(v   c)  5
18

In the case when retention strategies are feasible, overall consumer surplus is
CSr = (v   pri1 ) + 

v  
Z s
0
(pri2 + s)
1

ds 
Z s
s
(poi2   di)
1

ds 
Z 
s
poi2
1

ds

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CSr = v   c+ 11
25
+ 

v   2
5

4
5
+ c

  2
5

4
5
+ c  2
5


  1
5

1
5
+ c+
1
10


from which we obtain:
CSr = (1 + )(v   c)  1
10

CSr   CSnr = (1 + )(v   c)  1
10
 

(1 + )(v   c)  5
18


=
8
45
 > 0
Therefore, with retention strategies, overall consumer surplus is higher than that when
rms cannot implement retention strategies. The reason is that a higher proportion of
consumers pay lower prices (retained consumers and switchers). This proportion is equal
to 3
5
:
The overall welfare with retention strategies, W r, is given by
W r = CSr +rind
W r =

(1 + )(v   c)  1
10


+
2
25
W r = (1 + )(v   c)  1
50

And, as we saw in the benchmark case, without retention strategies the overall welfare,
W nr, is
W nr = (1 + ) (v   c)  1
18

Thus,
W r  W nr = (1 + )(v   c)  1
50
 

(1 + ) (v   c)  1
18


=
8
225
 > 0
We can therefore conclude that welfare increases when rms use retention strategies.
This happens because less consumers switch in equilibrium. In the model with switching
costs without retention strategies (Chen (1997)), all consumers with switching cost lower
50
than 
3
, will change supplier in the second period. With retention strategies, only con-
sumers with switching cost lower than 
5
will change provider in the second period. While
the deadweight loss with no retention strategies is equal to 
18
; with retention strategies
the deadweight loss is equal to 
50
:
The next table summarises the e¤ects on welfare in the cases with and without re-
tention strategies.
Consumer Surplus Prots Welfare Deadweight Loss
Without RS (1 + )(v   c)  5
18
 
9
(1 + ) (v   c)  1
18
 
18
With RS (v   c)(1 + )  1
10
 
25
(1 + )(v   c)  1
50
 
50
" ECS #  " W # DWL
Corollary 5. The analysis of BBPD with retention strategies under the switching costs
approach, suggests that retention strategies are good for consumers and overall welfare
but bad for rms, for any  > 0.
3.3 Comparison between the two approaches
In this section it is done a comparison between the equilibrium and welfare e¤ects of
BBPD with retention strategies under the switching costs approach and the brand pref-
erences approach. The table below shows the main results of each approach.
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Switching Costs Approach Brand Preferences Approach
poi2 p
o
i2 =
4
5
+ c poi2 =
4
5
t+ c
2nd Period pri2 p
r
i2 =
1
5
+ c pri2 =
1
5
t+ c
di d

i =
2
5
 di =
2
5
t
1st Period pi1 p

i1 = c  1125 < c pi1 = t(1  25) + c > c
W " W (# DWL) " W
Welfare CS " ECS " ECS
 #  # 
Relatively to second-period equilibrium prices, in both approaches second-period equi-
librium prices are below the uniform second-period price. If we compare second-period
prices with BBPD and no retention strategies in both approaches we have that passive
consumers pay a higher prices but all the others (retained consumers and switchers) pay
a lower, which suggest that consumers are better o¤with BBPD and retention strategies.
Regarding to rst-period prices under the switching costs approach rst-period equi-
librium price decreases when we move from BBPD with no retention strategies to BBPD
with retention strategies. The same happens in the brand preferences approach, i.e, rst
period price with retention strategies is below its no retention counterpart . However,
while in the brand preferences approach with no retention strategies rst period price is
above the uniform price, with retention strategies rst-period price is below the uniform
price. And marginal cost while under brand preferences approach rst-period price is
higher than marginal costs.
The welfare e¤ects of BBPDwith retention strategies are the same in both approaches,
such that: (i) consumer surplus increase; (ii) rms prots decrease; and, (iii) overall
welfare increases. Thus,the two models suggest that retention strategies are good for
consumers but bad for rms.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
The literature on BBPD is quite new and the analysis of the e¤ects of BBPD in com-
petitive markets considers the ability of rms to charge di¤erent prices to old and new
customers according their past purchases. The analysis of BBPD is done under two
di¤erent approaches - the switching costs approach and the brand preferences approach.
Both approaches claim that price discrimination is bad for prots and can decrease social
welfare due to ine¢ cient switching.
The main goal of this Dissertation was to provide a review of the economic literature
on BBPD and develop a theoretical model to investigate the ability of rms to implement
BBPD with retention strategies as a way to reduce consumer switching. While Esteves
and Rey (2010) investigate the economic and welfare e¤ects of BBPD with retention
strategies under the brand preferences approach, the model developed in this dissertation
has looked at the same issue in the switching costs approach.
The obtained results suggest that with retention strategies less consumers change
supplier in the second period (1
5
of consumers against 1
3
of consumers without retention)
because some of potential switchers receive a discount and decide not to change supplier.
In comparison with the equilibrium without retention strategies, second-period prices
for old customers, poi2 , are higher than without retention. In turn, second-period equilib-
rium prices for rivals rm customers, pri2 , are lower with retention than without reten-
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tion strategies (competitive e¤ects in order to increase the number of customers poached
from the rival, even those who can accepted the discount). First-period price is, as in the
benchmark case without retention (Chen (1997)), lower than marginal costs. Moreover,
rst-period price is lower with retention than without retention strategies because rms
compete harder in order to increase their base of locked-in customers.
Comparing the results of BBPD with retention strategies under the swithing costs
approach and the brand preferences approach, we can note that the analysis considering
retention supports the results without retention strategies. As in models with BBPD
(without retention), under both approaches second-period prices are lower than uniform
prices. And, the di¤erent feature is related to the trend of prices over the time. While
under switching costs approach prices increases over time, under brand preferences ap-
proaches prices decreases over the time.
The welfare e¤ects are as follows: (i) deadweight loss is lower under retention activity
because less consumers change supplier in the second period (less ine¢ cient switching);
(ii) rmsprots are lower with retention strategies because 3
5
of consumers pay a lower
price - customers who really change supplier and customers who are saved; and, (iii)
consumer surplus is higher with retention strategies because more customers pay a lower
price in the second period. Thus, retention strategies are good for consumers and bad for
prots. In general, there is an increase in social welfare due to less ine¢ cient switching.
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Chapter 5
Appendix
In this section is presented the proofs of the propositions.
Proof of Proposition 1. Each rm second period prot equals:
A2 =


(poA2   c) (1  poA2 + prB2) +
(1  )

(prA2   c)(poB2   prA2)
B2 =
(1  )

(poB2   c) (1  poB2 + prA2) +


(prB2   c)(poA2   prB2)
Each rm wants to maximize its prots with respect to poi2 and with respect to p
r
i2,
i = A;B. The rst-order conditions are
@A2
@poA2
=


(  poA2 + prB2) 


(poA2   c) = 0
poA2 =
+ prB2 + c
2
@A2
@prA2
=
(1  )

(poB2   prA2) 
(1  )

(prA2   c) = 0
prA2 =
poB2 + c
2
@B2
@poB2
=
(1  )

(  poB2 + prA2) 
(1  )

(poB2   c) = 0
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poB2 =
+ prA2 + c
2
@B2
@prB2
=


(poA2   prB2) 


(poA2   c) = 0
prB2 =
prA2 + c
2
Second-order conditions are also satised. Solving the systems of equation above, poi2 and
pri2; i = A;B; are given by
poA2 = p
o
B2 =
2
3
+ c (A)
prA2 = p
r
B2 =
1
3
+ c (B)
Proof of Proposition 2. We have seen that:
(i) If pA1 = pB1 and  = 12 ,
i =
1
2
(pi1   c) + 5
18

(ii) If pA1 < pB1 and  = 1, rm As overall prot is
A = pA1   c+ 4
9

and rm Bs overall prot is given by
B =

9
.
(iii) If pA1 > pB1, rms interchange positions thus  = 0. Thus,
A =

9
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and
B = pB1   c+ 4
9
:
To nd the rst-period equilibrium price suppose as an hipothesys that pA1 = pB1
and  = 1
2
. If for instance rm A decides to deviate to pdA1 > pB1 it would loose its rst
period demand and prot. Its prot from deviation would be equal to 
9
. Firm A has
no incentives to deviate from pA1 = pB1 as long as
1
2
(pA1   c) + 5
18
 =

9
from which we obatin pA1 = c   13: Consider now the case where rm A decides to
deviate to pdA1 < pB1: In this case it would capture all the market in period 1. Its prot
from deviation would be equal to pA1 c+ 49: Firm A has no incentives to deviate from
pA1 = pB1 as long as
pA1   c+ 4
9
 =
1
2
(pA1   c) + 5
18

from which we obatin pA1 = c   13: Doing the same for rm it is straightforward to
prove that rm B has no incentive to deviate from pA1 = pB1 as long as pB1 = c  13:
Therefore, rst period equilibrium price is equal to pi1 = c  3 with i = A;B.
Proof of Proposition 3. Each rm has the following prot function,
uA2 =


(puA2   c)(  puA2 + puB2)
uB2 =


(puB2   c)(puA2   puB2) + (1  )(puB2   c)
Solving the maximization problem of each rm, the rst order conditions are
@uA2
@puA2
= (puA2   c)

 


+


(  puA2 + puB2) = 0
puA2 =
+ c+ puB2
2
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@uB2
@puB2
=


(puA2   puB2) + (puB2   c)

 


+ (1  ) = 0
puB2 =
1
2
(puA2 + c) +
(1  )
2

Using the equations above, uniform prices are given by
puA2 =
(1 + )
3
+ c
puB2 =
(2  )
3
+ c
According to the results, puA2  puB2, if and only if   12 .
Solving the model for the case when puA2  puB2, es = puB2   puA2 and the amount of
consumers that choose each rm is given by
quB = (1  )
Z 
es
1

d(s)
quB =
(1  )

(  puB2 + puA2)
quA = (1  )
Z es
0
1

d(s) + 
Z 
0
1

d(s)
quA =
(1  )

(puB2   puA2) + 
The prots of each rm are
uA2 = (p
u
A2   c)quA
uA2 =
(1  )

(puA2   c)(puB2   puA2) + (puA2   c)
uB2 = (p
u
B2   c)quB
uB2 =
(1  )

(puB2   c)(  puB2 + puA2)
58
Solving the FOC, we obtain similar results, such that
puA2 =
(1 + )
3(1  )+ c
puB2 =
(2  )
3(1  )+ c
and, puA2  puB2, if and only if   12 .
Therefore, without price discrimination, the two rms equilibrium strategies are
puA2 =
8<:
(1+)
3
+ c, if   1
2
(1+)
3(1 )+ c, if  <
1
2
puB2 =
8<:
(2 )
3
+ c, if   1
2
(2 )
3(1 )+ c, if  <
1
2
Proof of Proposition 4. Looking into the rst case where   1
2
and puA2  puB2.
Given es = puA2   puB2, in the rst period and at given pair of prices (puA1; puB1), the
indi¤erent consumer between to buy from rm A or buy from rm B is
v   puA1 + 

v  
Z 
es p
u
A2
1

ds 
Z es
0
(puB2 + s)
1

ds

= v   puB1 +  (v   puB2)
Simplifying, we can get that
puA1   puB1 + 

(puA2   puB2) 
1
2
(puA2   puB2)2

= 0
From second-period equilibrium prices we have that (puA2 puB2) = (2 1)3 , for   12 .
Substituting in the equation above we nd that
puA1   puB1 +
(2  1)(4+ 1)
182
= 0
59
First-period prot for each rm is
uA1 = (p
u
A1   c)
and
uB1 = (p
u
B1   c)(1  )
Notice that  is a function of rst-period prices, so (puA1; p
u
B1) and the rst-order
condition, for rm A is
@uA1
@puA1
= + (puA1   c)
@(puA1; p
u
B1)
@puA1
= 0
and using the implicit di¤erentiation rule, we have
@(puA1; p
u
B1)
@puA1
=  @(p
u
A1; p
u
B1)
@puB1
=   9
3
(+ 1)
Thus, the rst-order condition for rm A becomes
@uA1
@puA1
=   (puA1   c)
93
(+ 1)
= 0
where,
puA1 =
(+ 1)
92
+ c
For rm B, we have that the rst-order condition is
@uB1
@puB1
= (1  ) + (puB1   c)
93
(+ 1)
= 0
and,
puB1 = (1  )
(+ 1)
93
+ c
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Substituing into equation ix, we nd that

(+ 1)
92
+ c

 

(1  )(+ 1)
93
+ c

+
(2  1)(4+ 1)
182
= 0
 =
1
2
Thus, with  = 1
2
we have that puA1 and p
u
B1 are given by
puA1 = c+
2
3

puB1 = c+
2
3

When  < 1
2
, puA2 < p
u
B2 and the indi¤erent consumer between choose rm A or rm
B in the rst period is such that
v   puA1 +  (v   puA2) = v   puB1 + 
 
v  
Z 
puB2 puA2
puB2
1

ds 
Z puB2 puA2
0
(puA2 + s)
1

ds
!
And, by analogy the result obtain is given by
puB1   puA1 +
(1  2)(5  4)
18(1  )2 = 0
And, the unique equilibrium occurs when  = 1
2
where rst-period prices are given
by
puA1 = c+
2
3

puB1 = c+
2
3

Proof of Proposition 5. In rm As turf, given the maximization problem of each
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problem, such that
Max
poA2

(poA2   c)

1
2
+
prB2   poA2
2t

Max
prB2

(prB2   c)

1   1
2
  p
r
B2   poA2
2t

Solving the problem we nd that rm Abest response and rm Bbest response are
poA2 =
t
2
+
prB2 + c
2
prB2 = t1  
t
2
+
poA2 + c
2
It thus follows that
poA2 =
1
3
t(21 + 1) + c
prB2 =
1
3
t(41   1) + c
In the rm Bs turf, each rm wants
Max
prA2

(prA2   c)

1
2
+
poB2   prA2
2t
  1

Max
poB2

(poB2   c)

1  1
2
  p
o
B2   prA2
2t

Firm As best response is
prA2 =
t
2
  t1 + p
o
B2 + c
2
and rm Bs best response is
poB2 =
t
2
+
prA2 + c
2
62
The result obtain is given by
prA2 =
1
3
t(3  41) + c
poB2 =
1
3
t(3  21) + c
If in the rst-period rms split equally the market, this means that 1 = 12 , and
poA2 = p
o
B2 = c+
2
3
t and prA2 = p
r
B2 = c+
1
3
t.
In the endpoints, each rm does not have an incentive to charge a price higher that
zero (because consumers are loyal and do not switch), such that pri2 = 0, i = A;B. When
prA2 = 0; 1 =
3
4
+ 3
4t
c  3
4
, and when prB2 = 0, 1 =
1
4
  3
4t
c  1
4
.
So, the set of equilibrium prices (poi2 ; p
r
i2 ); i = A;B;are:
(i) if 1
4
 1  34 :
poA2 =
1
3
t(21 + 1) + c; p
r
A2 =
1
3
t(3  41) + c
poB2 =
1
3
t(3  21) + c; prB2 =
1
3
t(41   1) + c
(ii) if 1  14 :
poA2 = t(1  21) + c; prA2 =
1
3
t(3  41) + c
poB2 =
1
3
t(3  21) + c; prB2 = c
(iii) if 1  34 :
poA2 =
1
3
t(21 + 1) + c; p
r
A2 = c
poB2 = t(21   1) + c; prB2 =
1
3
t(41   1) + c
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Proof of Proposition 6. Given the indi¤erent consumer such that 1 is
1 =
1
2
+
3(pB1   pA1)
2t(3 + )
For each rm, rst-period overall prots are given by
A1 = (pA1   c)1 + A2
B1 = (pB1   c)(1  1) + B2
Notice that 1 is a function of rst-period prices, such that
A1 = (pA1   c)1(pA1; pB1) + 

5
9
t(2(1(pA1; pB1))
2   21(pA1; pB1) + 1)

and
B1 = (pB1   c)(1  1(pA1; pB1)) + 

5
9
t(2(1(pA1; pB1))
2   21(pA1; pB1) + 1)

Solving the maximization problem, we have that
@A1
@pA1
= 0
5t
9

3
t ( + 3)
+
6
t ( + 3)

3(pB1   pA1)
2t ( + 3)
  1
2

  (pA1   c)
2t ( + 3)
  3(pB1   pA1)
2t ( + 3)
+
1
2
= 0
pA1 =   1
4   18
 
9pB1 + 9c+ 9t  7pB1 + 3c + 6t + t2

As the game is symmetric, pA1 = pB1, we get that
pA1 = p

B1 =
t
3
(3 + ) + c
At this prices, rms split evenly the market and 1 = 12 .
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First-period prots are
A1 = 

B1 =
t
6
(3 + )
Thus, the overall prots for each rm is
i = 

i1 + 

i2
i =
t
6
(3 + ) +
5
18
t
i =
t
18
(8 + 9)
Proof of Proposition 7. If rms cannot recognise their own customers and rivals
customers, each rm charges the same price to all consumers in the market. In the second
period, the indi¤erent consumer is located at 1 and he is indi¤erent to buying again from
rm A or changing supplier and buying from rm B if
puA2 + t1 = p
u
B2 + t(1  1)
1 =
1
2
+
puB2   puA2
2t
Each rm wants to maximize their prot and solves the following problem
Max
puA2
uA2 = (p
u
A2   c)1
Max
puB2
uB2 = (p
u
B2   c)(1  1)
The rst-order condition of rm A is given by
@uA2
@puA2
=
1
2
+
puB2   puA2
2t
+ (puA2   c)

  1
2t

= 0
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puA2 =
t
2
+
1
2
(puB2 + c)
For rm B we have the similar results, such that
@uB2
@puB2
=
1
2
  p
u
B2   puA2
2t
+ (puB2   c)

  1
2t

= 0
puB2 =
t
2
+
1
2
(puA2 + c)
Solving the problem, we nd that without price discrimination, second-period equi-
librium prices are
puA2 = p
u
B2 = t+ c
In the rst period, rmsproblem is similar and the rst-period equilibrium prices
are the same as in the second-period. So, rst-period equilibrium prices are given by
puA1 = p
u
B1 = t+ c
Thus, the equilibrium prices for this static game are
puA1 = p
u
A2 = p
u
B1 = p
u
B2 = t+ c
Firms prots in each period are the same and given by
uA = 
u
B =
1
2
t
Proof of Proposition 8. In the second-stage of period 2, the indi¤erent consumer
between to buying again from rm A at price poA2  dA or switching from rm B at price
prB2 is located at A:
poA2   dA + tA = prB2 + t(1  A)
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where,
A =
1
2
+
prB2   poA2 + dA
2t
The indi¤erent consumer to acting as a passive or active is located at cA, where
dA = 0. Thus,
cA =
1
2
+
prB2   poA2
2t
The game is symmetric and in rm Bs turf, the results are similar to those obtained
from rm A, and
B =
1
2
+
poB2   prA2   dB
2t
cB =
1
2
+
poB2   prA2
2t
(i) second stage
In the second stage each rm wants to maximize the return of saved customers and
solves the following problem
Max
dA
(poA2   dA   c)(A   cA)
Max
dB
(poB2   dB   c)(cB   B)
Given (A   cA) = dA2t , taking the rst derivative, we get
@
@dA
=  dA
2t
+ (poA2   dA   c)
1
2t
= 0
dA =
1
2
(poA2   c)
By analogy,
dB =
1
2
(poB2   c)
(ii) rst stage
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In the rst stage each rm solves the following problem on rm As turf:
Max
poA2
oA2 = (p
o
A2   c)cA + (poA2   dA   c)(A   cA);
with dA =
1
2
(poA2   c)
Max
prB2
rB2 = (p
r
B2   c)(1   A);
with dA =
1
2
(poB2   c)
Solving the maximization problem for each rm in rm As turf:
@oA2
@poA2
= 0

1
2
+
prB2   poA2
2t

+ (poA2   c)

  1
2t

+
1
2

1
4t
(poA2   c)

+
1
2
(poA2   c)

1
4t

= 0
poA2 =
2
3
t+
2
3
prB2 +
1
3
c
and,
@rB2
@prB2
=

1   1
2
  p
r
B2
2t
+
1
4t
(poA2 + c)

+ (prB2   c)

  1
2t

= 0
prB2 = t1  
1
2
t+
1
4
poA2 +
3
4
c
Given the previous results, we obtain that poA2, dA and p
r
B2 are
poA2 =
2
5
t(21 + 1) + c
dA =
1
5
t(21 + 1)
prB2 =
2
5
t(31   1) + c
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Looking now to rm Bs turf, we know that
B =
1
2
+
poB2   prA2   dB
2t
cB =
1
2
+
poB2   prA2
2t
Each rm wants to
Max
prA2
rA2 = (p
r
A2   c)(B   1);
where dB =
1
2
(poB2   c)
Max
poB2
oB2 = (p
o
B2   dB   c)(cB   B) + (poB2   c)(1  cB);
where dB =
1
2
(poB2   c)
Solving the rmsproblem, we obtain that
poB2 =
2
5
t(3  21) + c
dB =
1
5
t(3  21)
prA2 =
2
5
t(2  31) + c
Gathering the above results, when rms can implement retention strategies, second-
period equilibrium prices are given
poA2 =
2
5
t(21 + 1) + c; p
r
A2 =
2
5
t(2  31) + c
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poB2 =
2
5
t(3  21) + c; prB2 =
2
5
t(31   1) + c
with,
dA =
1
5
t(21 + 1)
dB =
1
5
t(3  21)
Proof of Proposition 9. With retentiton strategies and in the rst period, the
indi¤erent consumer is located at 1, such that
pA1 + t1 +  [p
r
B2 + t(1  1)] = pB1 + t(1  1) +  (prA2 + t1)
1 =
1
2
+
pB1   pA1 + (prA2   poB2)
2t(1  )
Given the equilibrium prices of second-period (prA2   poB2) = 25t(3  61). Thus, 1 is
given by
1 =
1
2
+
5(pB1   pA1)
2t(5 + )
It is straightforward that 1 is a function of rst-period prices, such that 1 =
f(pA1; pB1). The overall objective function for rm As prots is
A = (pA1   c)1(pA1; pB1) + 

1
50
t
 
48(1(pA1; pB1))
2   36(1(pA1; pB1)) + 19

and rm Bs objective function is
B = (pB1   c)1(pA1; pB1) + 

1
50
t
 
48(1(pA1; pB1))
2   60(1(pA1; pB1)) + 31

Substituing the expression of 1 into the above overall prot function and taking the
70
rst derivative for each rm, we get that
pA1 =
 
125c  250pB1 + 125t+ 70pB1 + 25c + 20t   t2

95   125
and,
pB1 =  
 
125pA1 + 125c+ 125t  95pA1 + 25c + 20t   t2

70   250
Joining both equations above, we get that rst-period equilibrium price for each rm
is
pA1 = p

B1 = t(1 

25
) + c
Second-order condition is given by
@2A
@A2
=
(7   25)
t ( + 5)2
which is negative for all  2 [0; 1].
Proof of Proposition 10. Solving the model by backward induction.
(i) second stage
Given
qBA =


(poA2   prB2   dA)
qsAA =


dA
qAA =


(  poA2 + prB2)
in the second stage, rmAwants to maximize its return obtained with saved customer.
Tthe maximization problem is the following
Max
dA
(poA2   dA   c)qsAA
Max
dA
(poA2   dA   c)



dA

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The rst order condition can be written as

 


dA + (p
o
A2   dA   c)

 


= 0
dA =
1
2
(poA2   c)
Looking now into the rm Bs turf, which has (1  ) market share in the beginning
of period 2. The indi¤erent consumer to buying again from rm B at price prB2 to rm
A and pay prA2 is
v   poB2 = v   prA2   s
s = poB2   prA2
Within the active consumers, I created two groups: switchers and saved consumers.
At sB the number of switchers is given by
qAB = (1  )
Z sB
0
1

ds
qAB =
(1  )

(poB2   prA2   dB)
Saved consumers are
qsBB = (1  )
Z sB
sB
1

ds
qsBB =
(1  )

dB
And, the number of inactive consumers is
qBB = (1  )
Z 
sB
1

ds
qBB =
(1  )

(  poB2 + prA2)
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Firm B solves the same maximization problem as rm A. Thus,
Max
dB
(poB2   dB   c)qsBB
Max
dB
(poB2   dB   c)

(1  )

dB

And, the rst-order condition is written as
 

(1  )

dB

+ (poB2   dB   c)

(1  )

dB

= 0
dB =
1
2
(poB2   c)
(ii) rst stage
In the rm As turf, each rm solves the following maximization problem
Max
poA2
oA2 = (p
o
A2   c)qAA + (poA2   dA   c)qsAA
s:t: dA =
1
2
(poA2   c)
and,
Max
prB2
rB2 = (p
r
B2   c)qBA
s:t: dA =
1
2
(poA2   c)
Finding the rst-order condition to rm A, it is obtained that
@oA2
@poA2
= 0


(  poA2 + prB2) + (poA2   c)

 


+
1
2


2
(poA2   c)

+
1
2
(poA2   c)


2

= 0
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poA2 =
2
3
+
2
3
prB2 +
1
3
c
And rm Bs rst-order condition is
@rB2
@prB2
=


(
1
2
poA2   prB2 +
1
2
c) + (prB2   c)

 


= 0
prB2 =
1
4
poA2 +
3
4
c
Joining the equations above I obtain that
poA2 =
2
3
+
2
3

1
4
poA2 +
3
4
c

+
1
3
c
poA2 =
4
5
+ c
So, the equilibrium is given by
poA2 =
4
5
+ c
prB2 =
1
5
+ c
dA =
2
5

Next, in rm Bs turf each rm has a similar maximization problem, such that
Max
poB2
oB2 = (p
o
B2   c)qBB + (poB2   dB   c)qsBB
s:t: dB =
1
2
(poB2   c)
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and,
Max
prA2
rA2 = (p
r
A2   c)qAB
s:t: dB =
1
2
(poB2   c)
Where rst-order conditions are
@oB2
@poB2
= 0
0 =
(1  )

(  poB2 + prA2) + (poB2   c)

 (1  )


+
1
2

(1  )
2
(poB2   c)

+
+

1
2
(poB2   c)

(1  )
2
poB2 =
2
3
+
2
3
prA2 +
1
3
c
@rA2
@prA2
=
(1  )


1
2
poB2   prA2 +
1
2
c

+ (prA2   c)

 (1  )


= 0
prA2 =
1
4
prB2 +
3
4
c
With the two equations above, I get that
poB2 =
2
3
+
2
3

1
4
poB2 +
3
4
c

+
1
3
c
poB2 =
4
5
+ c
and,
prA2 =
1
5
+ c
dB =
2
5
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So, second-period equilibrium is given by
poA2 =
4
5
+ c; dA =
2
5
; prA2 =
1
5
+ c
poB2 =
4
5
+ c; dB =
2
5
; prB2 =
1
5
+ c
Equilibrium prots for each rm is given by
A2 = (p
o
A2   c)



(  poA2 + prB2)

+ (poA2   dA   c)



dA

+
+(prA2   c)

(1  )

(poB2   prA2   dB)

B2 = (p
o
B2   c)

(1  )

(  poB2 + prA2)

+ (poB2   dB   c)

(1  )

dB

+
+(prB2   c)



(poA2   prB2   dA)

where,
A2 =

25
(11+ 1)
B2 =

25
(12  11)
For rm A, second-order condition is given by  3
2
and for rm B is 3( 1)
2
, which are
negative for any  2 [0; 1].
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